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International Journal of Computer Applications
Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA
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| Volume 187 - Issue 146 |
| Published: October 2026 |
| Authors: Yang Yang, Shu Jiang, Hong Ye, Yanyi She, Ming Liu, Yuefeng Li |
10.5120/ijca66aa6399afa5
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Yang Yang, Shu Jiang, Hong Ye, Yanyi She, Ming Liu, Yuefeng Li . A Lightweight Flow-Statistics-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation Mechanism in SDN. International Journal of Computer Applications. 187, 146 (October 2026), 47-52. DOI=10.5120/ijca66aa6399afa5
@article{ 10.5120/ijca66aa6399afa5,
author = { Yang Yang,Shu Jiang,Hong Ye,Yanyi She,Ming Liu,Yuefeng Li },
title = { A Lightweight Flow-Statistics-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation Mechanism in SDN },
journal = { International Journal of Computer Applications },
year = { 2026 },
volume = { 187 },
number = { 146 },
pages = { 47-52 },
doi = { 10.5120/ijca66aa6399afa5 },
publisher = { Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA }
}
%0 Journal Article
%D 2026
%A Yang Yang
%A Shu Jiang
%A Hong Ye
%A Yanyi She
%A Ming Liu
%A Yuefeng Li
%T A Lightweight Flow-Statistics-based DDoS Detection and Mitigation Mechanism in SDN%T
%J International Journal of Computer Applications
%V 187
%N 146
%P 47-52
%R 10.5120/ijca66aa6399afa5
%I Foundation of Computer Science (FCS), NY, USA
Software-defined networking (SDN) provides centralized control and programmable flow management, making it suitable for dynamic detection and mitigation of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. This paper proposes a lightweight flow-statistics-based DDoS detection and mitigation mechanism for SDN. The controller periodically collects OpenFlow flow statistics and extracts four interpretable indicators: aggregated packet rate, source count, flow count, and normalized source-address entropy. A destination is first marked as a candidate attack target when all four traffic conditions are simultaneously satisfied, and a DDoS attack is confirmed only when the suspicious state persists for a predefined duration, thereby suppressing alarms caused by transient traffic bursts. Once an attack is confirmed, the controller dynamically installs high-priority source-specific drop rules and uses an OpenFlow barrier mechanism to confirm mitigation-rule processing. Experiments were conducted in a Mininet environment using Ryu, Open vSwitch, and OpenFlow 1.3. Low-, medium-, and high-rate UDP DDoS scenarios were independently repeated three times, with observed packet rates of 481.81 ± 1.09 pps, 964.00 ± 0.98 pps, and 1606.10 ± 1.08 pps, respectively. The attack-confirmation duration remains approximately 1 s, while the mean barrier-confirmed mitigation delay ranges from 0.7938 ms to 0.8878 ms. A 0.5-s multi-source burst satisfies the traffic-feature conditions but is not confirmed as a DDoS attack, demonstrating the effectiveness of the suspicious-duration mechanism. Additional experiments show that TCP SYN and ICMP flooding attacks can also be successfully detected and mitigated. The installed source-specific rules effectively block attack traffic while preserving legitimate communication with the victim host.